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ABSTRACT 
Inequalities are growing on a global scale today and rising consumerism has exacerbated the 
negative connotations of material deprivation in many places. What does this imply for how 
poor people experience their situation? What role does religion play in their lives? This paper 
explores these questions by studying how young Qur’anic students (almajirai) in Kano in 
northern Nigeria experience, and deal with, being poor. In the context of growing violent 
conflict related to the Boko Haram insurgency, poor Muslims, including the almajirai, have 
frequently been cast as being prone to violence in order to claim their share of highly 
unequally distributed resources. Religion has often been portrayed as a radicalizing force in 
their lives. This paper challenges such views. It describes how the almajirai deploy religious 
discourses to moderate feelings of inadequacy and shame triggered by experiences of 
exclusion. At the same time, recourse to religious discourses emphasizing the values of 
asceticism and endurance does not further an agenda of social change and thus risks 
perpetuating the almajirai’s weak social position. The paper concludes that consumerism and 
wealth-based definitions of status are likely to silence demands for social justice.  
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IT MEANS TO BE POOR 
Your family eats their porridge without soup! 
Some months into my fieldwork in Kano State, northern Nigeria, I jokingly complained to a 
group of children I had befriended in my rural field site of Albasu that nobody had gone to 
the trouble of teaching me Hausa swearwords yet, which put me at risk of failing to even 
notice potential insults. To mend the gap in my language skills, one boy1 gave me the above 
phrase as an example of an insult among children. Most Hausa dishes consist of cereal 
porridge (tuwo) eaten with a soup (miya) that is made, for example, of baobab tree leaves, 
okra or pumpkin and spinach. Having to eat the sticky tuwo on its own indicates dire food 
deprivation. 
I was surprised to learn that labelling someone as being food-deprived was abuse, 
especially as this came from a boy who himself, by most definitions, would be considered 
poor. Poverty is both deep and widespread in Kano, especially in rural areas. This is 
evidenced, for instance, by high malnutrition rates: an estimated 46.3 per cent of children 
under five years of age in Kano State are stunted (too short for their age), 28.9 per cent of 
them severely so, which indicates long-term undernutrition. An estimated 17.1 per cent of 
children under five years old in Kano are two or more standard deviations below the median 
weight for children of that height, which points to moderate to severe wasting (National 
Population Commission 2009: 382). Even porridge with soup does not necessarily provide 
children with the necessary balance of essential nutrients and vitamins, and many families 
cannot afford to buy fruit or meat. How is it that poverty, despite being pervasive, has such a 
negative connotation in northern Nigeria today, even among the poor? What does this imply 
for how poor people relate to others who are poor and to the better-off in society?  
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A growing body of literature explores the experiences of people living in poverty, in 
Africa and elsewhere. Dissatisfied with income-based definitions, many poverty researchers 
have urged us to view poverty as a multidimensional experience, which is not conclusively 
defined by a lack of material possessions (see, for example, Alkire 2002; Sen 1999). What is 
more, material deprivation has a negative connotation in many places, exacerbating the injury 
inflicted upon poor people by their lack of material means. Sen (1983: 159) suggests that 
shame, alongside obvious deprivations such as starvation and hunger, is at the ‘irreducible 
absolutist core’ of the idea of poverty. The ‘absolute satisfaction’ of certain needs – including 
living without shame – may depend ‘on a person’s relative position vis-à-vis others’ (Sen 
1983). Poverty-related shame ‘occurs as a reaction to the sense of failure in living up to 
societal expectations which, in turn, become internalized as personal aspirations’ (Walker et 
al. 2013: 217). More than three decades of economic restructuring in the wake of structural 
adjustment have exacerbated inequalities across the African continent – inequalities of 
income as well as of health and education. Various authors illustrate powerfully how people’s 
experiences of deprivation are intensified by knowing that others in society enjoy what they 
do not have access to (see, for example, Ferguson 1999; Katz 2004).  
Widespread poverty and inequality have triggered questions about the role religion 
plays in the lives of poor people. In the context of growing violent conflict relating to the 
Boko Haram insurgency, poor Muslims in northern Nigeria have frequently been cast as 
being prone to violence in order to claim their share of highly unequally distributed 
resources. In both popular and academic writings, religion has been portrayed as a 
radicalizing agent in their lives, and many authors quote statistics on the high incidence of 
poverty in northern Nigeria as if such statistics in themselves could ‘explain’ the current 
crisis (see, for example, Abbah 2013; Awofeso et al. 2003; Comolli 2013; Griswold 2014; 
Robertson 2012). Yet the empirical evidence that exists about Boko Haram refutes the 
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‘simplistic application of economic deprivation theory’ (Umar 2012: 118). The vast majority 
of poor northern Nigerians have not joined and do not support Boko Haram. 
In contrast to discourses casting religion as a radicalizing force, prominent thinkers 
within the sociology of religion have described how religion can serve to legitimize existing 
economic and political power relations, for example by levelling poor people’s aspirations or 
by justifying their destitution as divinely ordained (see Bourdieu 1971; Berger 1967). 
‘Religious capital’ and the power to ‘produce’ particular religious discourses are indeed 
unlikely to be distributed evenly (Bourdieu 1971). For instance, poor people may have little 
leverage over religious norms that disparage them, perhaps because they view wealth as a 
sign of God’s favour, and conversely its absence as proof of his wrath or indifference. Yet 
this should not detract attention from the agency of poor people who may deliberately turn 
religious discourses to their own ends. For the African context, several authors have 
described how poor people draw on particular strands of religious ideology to manipulate 
their social or economic position. The appeal of Islamic reformist ideas to poor urban youth 
in West Africa, for instance, has been linked to the fact that such ideas provide a justification 
for rejecting costly traditional social practices such as sumptuous wedding celebrations (see, 
for example, Kane 2003; Loimeier 2003; Masquelier 2009).  
The role played by particular or novel religious movements and ideologies in the 
economic lives and opportunities of their adherents has been relatively well documented (on 
Pentecostalism, see Gifford 2004; Marshall 1991; Meyer 1999). However, few authors have 
taken the experience of poverty, and people’s attempts to come to terms with it, as the 
starting point of their analysis (for a notable exception, see Last 2000a). This means that little 
is known about how poor Muslims make use of religious discourses to reclaim dignity and 
resources in the face of poverty. Drawing on ethnographic and participatory fieldwork with 
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young Qur’anic students (almajirai) in Kano in northern Nigeria, this paper offers an 
empirical enquiry into how young people at the lower end of society use religious discourses 
to moderate the feelings of inadequacy and shame triggered by experiences of exclusion. It 
challenges the truism that Islam is ultimately a radicalizing force in the lives of poor young 
Muslims, and nuances assumptions about its role in legitimizing existing power structures.  
The following section discusses methods and data. After introducing the almajirai, I 
trace the historical meanings of poverty in northern Nigeria that provide the backdrop to their 
experiences. I then ask how the almajirai seek to salvage a positive sense of self, and how 
they relate to others in society. To escape the negative connotations of poverty and to cope 
with denigrating experiences, the almajirai reinterpret their deprivation as a voluntary 
exercise in asceticism and a necessary part of their education. Also, they claim the religious 
and moral high ground to rebuke those treating them badly. However, their room for 
manoeuvre is constrained in a context in which conspicuous consumption is increasingly 
considered a marker of success and status. Self-assertive strategies go hand in hand with 
strategies that do not seek to challenge dominant discourses or socio-economic power 
structures, but instead reinforce them. The conclusion summarizes the lessons that can be 
drawn from the example of the almajirai for the experiences and strategies of poor people 
more widely.  
METHODS AND DATA 
This paper builds on thirteen months of fieldwork carried out in Kano State in northern 
Nigeria between 2009 and 2011. My fieldwork included four months in Albasu, a small rural 
town in Albasu Local Government Area (LGA) in the east of Kano State. Albasu, largely 
dependent on agriculture, is one of the poorest areas in Kano State. For the remaining nine 
months, I lived close to the city gate Sabuwar Ƙofa within Kano’s Old City. I collected data 
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in the form of fieldwork observations, semi-structured interviews, group conversations and 
casual interactions with almajirai, their parents, caregivers and teachers, as well as with 
former almajirai.  
My data also include material from participatory research, including discussions of the 
photographs that young almajirai took with disposable cameras, and ‘radio interviews’ they 
conducted among themselves with my tape recorder. In addition, I draw on data from the 
production process of a participatory documentary film or docudrama that I organized during 
my research about almajirai’s perspectives on their lives and the challenges they face. This 
includes stories narrated or written down during the script-writing process, as well as 
discussions about the way in which they would like to see their lives and identities 
represented on screen. The nine participating youths were aged between fifteen and twenty 
years and came from three different Qur’anic schools in which I had previously taught 
English.  
The following section discusses the context of the almajiri system past and present. It 
traces the decline of this once highly regarded educational institution to the economic, social 
and political margins, and takes stock of the – overwhelmingly negative – discourses that 
circulate about it today in Nigeria. Finally, it sets out the reasons why families still opt to 
enrol children in the system today. 
WHO ARE THE ALMAJIRAI? 
The almajirai are boys and young men from primary school age to their early twenties who 
come to urban areas to study the Qur’an, often in deprived circumstances. They are enrolled 
in ‘residential colleges’ beyond the state’s purview and regulatory interventions. Many 
schools lack physical infrastructure beyond a canopied forecourt where the teaching takes 
place, compelling their students to cohabit other spaces such as mosques or neighbours’ 
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entrance halls (soro). The almajirai learn to read, write and recite the Holy Qur’an. Modern 
and secular subjects, and Islamic subjects other than the Qur’an, do not form part of their 
curriculum. During their lesson-free time, the almajirai earn their livelihood.  
As they lack alternative means of subsistence, many young students beg daily for food 
and money, a task made more arduous by the widespread contempt for almajirai. Many 
almajirai complain of being chased away, or being given leftovers that are on the brink of 
spoiling. Students may also find employment as domestic workers, particularly in middle- 
and upper-class households. As many women live secluded lives (purdah), they depend on 
children as go-betweens for their transactions with the world outside their compounds. 
However, payment for such work is often minimal, and treatment sometimes abusive. 
The ‘traditional’ Qur’anic school system is widespread in Muslim West Africa and 
used mostly by poor rural families. Children are handed over to the teacher (malam, or 
malamai in the plural) who receives no salary but lives off the support given by the local 
community, the alms received in exchange for his spiritual services, the contributions of his 
students and supplementary income-generating activities. Most teachers are themselves 
products of the almajiri system. While many students return home at least once a year (for 
the major holidays or to help their parents farm), others do not see their parents for years. 
Some teachers migrate with their schools following seasonal agricultural patterns.  
Since modern education was introduced in Nigeria under British colonial rule, the 
prestige and political influence of ‘traditional’ Qur’anic scholars have gradually diminished. 
Economic decline since the 1980s affected the almajirai as it reduced both their income 
opportunities and the ability of others in society to support them through alms (see Lubeck 
1985). The emergence of reform-oriented Islamic movements in Nigeria marginalized the 
almajiri system further (see Kane 2003; Loimeier 1997). Increasingly, it attracted criticism as 
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a Hausa cultural accretion to Islam. Many object to the almajirai’s practice of begging, 
which, in their view, Islam permits only in acute emergencies (see Bambale 2007). Prestige 
and status increasingly derive from mastering the ‘modern’ or reformed forms of knowledge 
associated with ‘high culture’ Islam. Such knowledge is taught, for example, in Islamiyya 
schools, which have become popular with many northern Nigerian Muslims. Whereas 
‘traditional’ Qur’anic schools focus almost exclusively on Qur’anic memorization and 
recitation (using the qira’a of Warsh), Islamiyya schools teach the Qur’an (qira’a of Hafs) as 
well as other Islamic subjects, including Fiqh, Hadith and Arabic.  
Moreover, the almajiri system has been declared responsible for religious violence, 
particularly since the Maitatsine crisis in the 1980s. Members of an Islamic sect, condemning 
elite corruption and the enjoyment of Western consumer goods, rose against the police, 
resulting in hundreds of deaths. The Maitatsine insurgents were believed to be mainly 
‘traditional’ Qur’anic school students. In the context of the current Boko Haram Islamist 
insurgency with its attacks on government institutions, including modern and secular schools, 
‘traditional’ Qur’anic students are accused of furnishing the ‘foot soldiers’ (see, for example, 
Soyinka 2012). 
Today, the almajiri system promises neither access to political power nor high social 
status, its former economic viability has largely been undermined and its religious merit has 
come under attack. Students are vilified as presumed perpetrators of violence. Yet demand 
for the system persists. Many believe that this is because parents enrolling their children as 
almajirai are ‘backward’ and ‘negligent’ and do not appreciate secular knowledge (see 
Kumolu 2012; Sule-Kano 2008). However, my research suggests a more complex story. 
Increasing acceptance of modern and secular education in principle has been thwarted 
by state withdrawal from the education sector since structural adjustment (see, for example, 
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Baba 2011). While basic education is officially free, in reality it implies recurrent costs: for 
textbooks, writing materials and uniforms, as well as in the form of opportunity costs of 
foregone children’s work (see Tomasevski 2005). Poor-quality teaching (see Johnson 2011), 
insecurity about the transition to the next level of schooling and more than uncertain pay-offs 
in terms of future opportunities make parents wonder whether secular school is worth the 
investment. 
Among large parts of the rural population, the almajiri system is valued for the 
Qur’anic knowledge, character building and life skills it is believed to impart (see, for 
example, Ware 2014 on Qur’anic schooling in Senegal). Strictness and physical punishment 
are perceived as necessary and even beneficial for a child and his learning, and while it is 
recognized that parents are reluctant to be too harsh, this is seen as weakness. Thus it appears 
sensible to send sons away to live with a malam. 
In addition, the almajiri system offers redress for a number of difficult situations. The 
accumulation of resources to launch an adult career – that is, to build a room for prospective 
bride(s) and children, and to marry – affords a real challenge to adolescent boys and young 
men in a largely eroding rural economy where opportunities to earn cash income are scarce. 
Seasonal or permanent migration to the cities, where petty income opportunities are available 
as street vendors and odd-job men, promises redress (see, for example, Mortimore 1998). 
Divorce is frequent and easy to achieve in Hausaland, and often necessitates that children be 
‘re-accommodated’. Divorced mothers, who are expected to remarry soon, can rarely move 
into new marriages with children from previous ones. Children left with fathers are at risk of 
suffering neglect, and abuse from stepmothers. High maternal mortality also renders children 
motherless (Federal Ministry of Health 2011). For boys, the almajiri system offers a way out 
of such constrained circumstances. 
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In brief, the almajirai epitomize a range of social and material deprivations. The next 
section traces the historical meanings of such deprivations in northern Nigeria. It describes 
how a context of growing socio-economic inequality and consumerism has exacerbated the 
negative connotations of poverty. And yet poor people are not helpless victims, and they 
resourcefully deploy religious arguments to reclaim dignity and resources.  
HISTORICAL MEANINGS OF POVERTY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
It is useful to distinguish between structural and conjunctural poverty, as Iliffe (1987) 
suggests. The former refers to destitution caused by systemic factors, such as lack of land or 
labour, and the latter to the momentary deprivation caused by ill fortune or personal failure. 
We may juxtapose these involuntary forms of poverty with the voluntaristic poverty of the 
ascetic, who renounces worldly luxuries of his own free will.  
Deep structural poverty in Hausaland is largely a product of the changes brought about 
by colonialization and industrialization, but already in precolonial times, ‘a grain-based 
agriculture dependent upon a short and unreliable wet season bred numbers of very poor 
cultivators whose condition resulted less from shortage of land or accident of birth than from 
ill fortune, personal inadequacy, or … incapacitation’ (Iliffe 1987: 34). Moreover, the 
situation of slaves has long been precarious (see, for example, Smith 1954). Yet in the 
absence of a modern transport system, which would later concentrate trade and industry in 
the towns, as a whole the countryside was comparatively prosperous. Poor Hausa could 
survive on crafts, or by establishing ‘a client relationship with a wealthier patron, working on 
his farm and performing menial tasks in return for subsistence and help in establishing an 
independent household’ (Iliffe 1987: 34). Dire poverty or destitution, when it occurred, 
implied a ‘lack of normal social relations, and hence lack of support (other than charity) 
when incapacitated’ (Iliffe 1987: 42). Precolonial Hausaland also knew the voluntary poor: 
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ascetic malamai who, following longstanding traditions of Sufi scholarship (see, for example, 
Reid 2013), renounced the pleasures of this world to devote their lives to religion. However, 
historically, access to a career in Islamic learning was restricted to scholarly families (Smith 
1959).2  
Traditionally, Hausa society juxtaposed talakawa (poor commoners) and masu sarauta 
(wealthy office-holders), while slaves constituted the bottom stratum of society. According to 
Smith, political ‘office has always been the principal road to wealth among the Hausa’ (Smith 
1959: 241). Not only slaves but also talakawa stood limited chances of accessing wealth and 
status, however, as occupational status, which mapped relatively neatly onto wealth 
categories, was ‘almost wholly ascriptive’ (Smith 1959: 251). Particular professions were 
reserved to ‘closed descent groups between which all movement is disapproved’ (Smith 
1959: 251). Social mobility and status could thus rarely be achieved through individual 
achievement in the professional domain, as Western conceptions of presumably ‘self-made’ 
social mobility have it.  
While historically access to riches was thus unevenly distributed in Hausaland, wealth 
was – and still is – considered a blessing that ought to be shared to some extent. ‘It is the 
hoarding of wealth for oneself that is questioned: miserliness suggests the wealth came not 
from Allah but through some evil pact or witchcraft,’ writes Last (2000a: 222–3). Conversely, 
poverty ‘implies either failure in attracting Allah’s blessing or a pact that went wrong; the 
poor are not specially beloved of Allah’ (Last 2000a: 223). Alms-giving in this context was 
(and is) not a ‘charitable’ act, but meant to ‘sacrifice’ a part of one’s wealth in order to earn 
protection from the powers causing misfortune. This was a real concern to the powerful, 
whose ‘right to power’ depended on their ability to ensure the well-being of their households 
or communities (Last 2000a: 223).  
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In brief, with the exception of ascetic scholarship, being poor has long been a sign of 
low status in Hausaland. At the same time, it was considered divinely ordained rather than 
self-inflicted and entailed certain expectations towards wealthier patrons, with the effect that 
dire destitution was limited to exceptional circumstances. To what extent have ‘modern’ 
developments altered the meanings of poverty?  
People not belonging to ‘ruling’ families still frequently refer to themselves as 
commoners (talakawa) and attribute a range of conditions and behaviours to this status, 
which commonly implies a concomitant lack of resources.3 For example, a poor mother in 
my rural field site explained to me that she let her daughter marry a well-off medic who 
treated her badly because ‘he has money, and we are talakawa. Amina really wanted to marry 
him, and he brought us so much money.’ 
Being a talaka is not a cause of shame (and slave origin carries little stigma today; see 
Last 2000a), but, as suggested by the quote at the beginning of this paper, people who are 
destitute (matsiyaci, or matsiyata in the plural) are looked down upon. I have not come across 
anyone identifying himself or herself as being destitute, as destitution is treated as something 
to be concealed. When I told the youths participating in the film project that there were many 
poor people in the US, Abdullahi declared the Americans to be ‘cunning’ (suna da wayo): 
everything looked neat and wealthy in the American films he had seen, so they knew how not 
to ‘show their poor’. 
Economic and societal changes and growing socio-economic inequality have 
exacerbated the negative connotations of poverty. Where inequalities are large, the poor are a 
particularly long way away from achieving what other people in society have. As suggested 
in the introduction, this may trigger experiences of shame. Shame arising from a failure to 
procure material goods may be most strongly felt in societies ‘where consumerism is 
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increasingly seen as the mark of success’ (Chase and Walker 2013: 752). However, 
traditional notions of shame in Hausaland have little to do with one’s ability to procure 
material goods. Kunya, which means ‘modesty’, ‘self-restraint’ or ‘shyness’ (see, for example, 
Gaudio 2009: 208) as well as ‘shame’, refers to behaviour considered appropriate to 
someone’s age, gender and social status. Kunya also refers to a reluctance to publicly display 
affection, especially affection that is associated with sexual relations (see, for example, Last 
2000b: 378). While poverty may not evoke shame in the sense of kunya in northern Nigeria, 
with consumerism gaining momentum,4 it attracts disdain, especially among those who are 
not poor.  
However, certain cultural and religious discourses seem to impose a limit on 
consumerist ideologies, or at least to furnish those unable to engage in conspicuous 
consumption with the necessary vocabulary to reclaim some legitimacy and dignity. 
Longstanding Sufi traditions of ascetic scholarship are a case in point (see below). Also, 
Islam encourages ‘generosity as reciprocation for God’s bounty’ and enjoins the Muslim 
umma to ‘purif[y] and [maintain] its wealth by giving up a portion of it in alms, and [to take] 
ample account of the kinsman as well as the disturbing, unknown, poor stranger’ (Bonner 
2005: 404; see Salih 1999). Poverty is seen not only to put individuals and their faith at risk 
as it may push them ‘to cross the limits of religion and morality’ but to endanger ‘the security 
and stability of the society as a whole’ (both Al-Qaradawi 1994 cited in Salih 1999: 69). 
Religious injunctions enjoining the rich to support the poor generously allow poor 
people to assess – and judge – the behaviour of the wealthy. For example, the fact that giving 
in secret does not seem to come easy to the rich in Hausaland gave rise to a mixture of 
cynicism and amusement among my respondents. The youths participating in the film project 
considered those donating food during Ramadan to be calculating rather than acting 
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selflessly. They would give generously during Ramadan (when God rewards good deeds at a 
tenfold higher rate) but would stop giving once Ramadan was over, the almajirai scoffed.  
A number of factors work against the interests of the poor, though. The dictates of 
shame (kunya, see above) usually require people to exert self-constraint and modesty, 
meaning that the poor stand few chances of making effective claims on the resources of the 
rich. My neighbours’ small children, who often came to visit me, for instance, would usually 
refuse the sweets or fruit I offered them. I learned that their father, the malam, had impressed 
upon them not to accept food from people in the neighbourhood so as not to appear greedy or 
gluttonous.  
The growing gulf between rich and poor also reinforces spatial segregation, as the 
better-off move to gated communities or shield their compounds with barbed wire and armed 
guards. This makes it more difficult for poor people to lodge claims and to get a hearing from 
the rich in society. Furthermore, religious reform movements, which are garnering increasing 
support, have been said to challenge traditional redistributive practices and to provide ethics 
that match the new individualistic and acquisitive economic spirit. Kane writes that the 
reformist Izala,5 founded in 1978 in opposition to the Sufi brotherhoods, appealed to the 
‘nouveaux riches’ brought forth by the oil boom, who sensed that ‘some traditional values 
and institutions hampered their economic goals and curtailed their autonomy’. Religious 
reformism allowed them to eschew ‘costly traditional practices of wealth redistribution’ 
(Kane 2003: 237).  
Meanwhile, the increased movement and mixing of people in the context of 
urbanization and demographic growth may also have contributed to the emergence of 
strategies to signal status that put wealth or conspicuous consumption centre stage. In a very 
status-conscious environment like Hausa society, migrating means removing oneself, at least 
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to some extent and for some time, from one’s assigned position within the status hierarchy. 
Coming to a noisy, crowded and heavily populated city such as Kano means encountering 
instances of anonymity (Last 2008: 43) and unstable hierarchies made in the present moment. 
In this context, demonstrations of wealth – expensive cars, flashy mobile phones, glamorous 
clothes – are a popular default option for those wishing to make claims to high rank.  
How do the almajirai position themselves within this context and how do they manage 
to maintain a positive sense of self? The next section describes their strategies to come to 
terms with experiences of exclusion and denigration. I also highlight the contradictory, 
potentially self-defeating and socially corrosive effects of some of their strategies. 
MAKING SENSE OF INEQUALITY 
Asceticism: endurance as a show of faith and character? 
Most of the almajirai I got to know well were from poor families, and most of the families 
enrolling children as almajirai that I knew were poor. Given current political and economic 
conditions in northern Nigeria, the almajirai’s prospects of escaping poverty as they come of 
age are slim. Nonetheless, the young people with whom I conducted my research portrayed 
their deprivation as finite – a temporary sacrifice for knowledge’s sake. This not only allowed 
them to maintain hope for a better future, but also to position themselves within the category 
of the voluntaristic poor.  
I gained the impression that the burden of poverty was easier to carry for the almajirai 
when they could reinterpret it as a deliberate choice. Their teachers did so routinely. The 
malamai I befriended in Albasu considered modesty and frugality outstanding virtues. They 
were, for instance, reluctant at first to allow their students to participate in our film project as 
they objected to the presumably immoral nature of the film industry. Once the youths had 
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acquired a taste for money, they would not study diligently anymore. They themselves would 
not do anything for the sake of money, they claimed, but for the sake of God alone. What 
God provided them with in their fields was all they needed and desired. This, of course, 
simplified their lived realities, as cash had also penetrated their daily lives as subsistence 
farmers. Yet, from their declaration transpires the ideal of living uncorrupted by the 
temptations of money. One teacher in Albasu explained corruption among the Nigerian elites 
in similar terms: as their children grew up close to money, they would get used to it, and once 
they were old, they would put the money they received into their bank accounts rather than 
using it to help the poor.  
The almajirai could also embrace frugality or asceticism as a desirable, if also 
necessary, virtue. Cultural norms that ascribe educative value to hardship provide a 
vocabulary with which almajirai can justify their deprived conditions, eschewing the familiar 
narratives of poverty and parental neglect. In this way, being an almajiri can attenuate the 
negative connotations of poverty. After all, have not the almajirai proved their outstanding 
religious dedication by forgoing the (presumed) comforts of home for the sake of knowledge? 
The almajirai I got to know well worked towards this narrative. During script writing, the 
boys involved in the film project invoked any number of social, cultural and religious 
arguments to justify enrolment as almajiri, for example: 
At home, he [a child] becomes stubborn, quarrelsome with other children and 
disrespectful towards elders. If he’s told to go to school, he doesn’t go. He just goes 
for a stroll, annoying the people in the neighbourhood. 
Parents want their children to get to know their religion, and know people, and know 
how to live together with people. 
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The youths I got to know well in the course of my research joked about their own and each 
other’s material hardships in a way that made me think of boy scout-style displays of 
toughness. Ibrahim, for example, a young teacher in Albasu who enjoyed introducing me to 
curious Hausa concepts, once teasingly asked me whether I knew gajala. That was the 
almajirai’s food, he declared, and described the ‘recipe’: one had to combine soups of 
various kinds (miyan kala-kala), leave the potpourri to stand overnight, and heat it up in the 
morning. His description of this presumed ‘Hausa dish’ caused amusement among the 
bystanders (including other almajirai), who were aware that almajirai often have to scramble 
together various different leftovers to fill their stomachs. Ibrahim’s description took the edge 
off the almajirai’s food deprivation. Sadisu, an almajiri at Sabuwar Ƙofa, boasted that he got 
so used to eating whatever food he could get hold of, including food on the brink of spoiling, 
that today nothing could disturb his stomach. 
Being poor and being used to exercising ‘patience’ when it came to monetary expenses 
(or even the necessities of life) were considered some kind of ‘almajiri trademark’. For 
example, one evening Abubakar, an almajiri from Albasu, called me in Kano while his 
schoolmates were with me for the film project. He passed his phone to an acquaintance who 
also wanted to greet me, but quickly took it back and hung up abruptly, although we were 
only halfway through the standard greetings. The fact that Abubakar did not want to spend 
his hard-earned phone credit on other people’s extensive greetings caused amusement among 
the other almajirai. ‘Almajiri – sai a yi haƙuri!’ they explained, laughing. (An almajiri has 
only one option: have patience!) Being able to share one’s phone credit generously was not a 
freedom the almajirai could currently enjoy. 
Material want caused neither grief nor shame if it could be reinterpreted as a more or 
less self-inflicted temporary condition one had entered for the sake of knowledge. To 
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exercise patience (yi haƙuri) is a valued cultural skill in Hausa society. It means ‘to endure 
pain, to refrain from letting your passions get the better of you, and to put your trust in God’ 
(Gaudio 2009: 198). In a context where individuals are expected to subordinate their wishes 
and desires to socially sanctioned norms and authorities, and where people’s hopes and future 
plans are often shattered by difficult economic, social and political circumstances, haƙuri is 
an indispensable skill.  
The almajirai invoked their own ‘proven’ ability to withstand hardship to set 
themselves apart from other young people. In one instance, for example, some almajirai from 
Sabuwar Ƙofa visiting my house were talking about their malam’s son Ali; he was slightly 
younger than them and until now had lived with his parents and had attended a modern 
secular (boko) school. To get him to follow in his footsteps as a Qur’anic teacher, his father 
now wondered about sending him away as an almajiri. The almajirai questioned whether this 
could prepare Ali for the task of teaching almajirai. As ɗan birni, a ‘city boy’ (as opposed to 
a ‘villager’ or ɗan ƙauye), he had not experienced hardship and would therefore fail to 
comprehend the almajirai’s circumstances. He would be unable to exercise enough strictness 
to ensure that his students studied well. Being able to withstand hardship was also a quality 
invoked to redeem ‘village almajirai’ vis-à-vis urban almajirai, potentially to counter the 
widespread association of village life with a lack of sophistication and exposure to the world 
more widely. Buhari, who was studying in Albasu when I met him, told me that almajirai 
staying in Kano City all year round lacked the ability to cope with village life, whereas he 
and other almajirai who migrated seasonally could deal with the challenges of both 
environments.  
Claiming the religious and moral high ground 
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Mann, when writing about young refugees in Tanzania, states that one strategy children use 
to keep feeling strong is ‘to assert their cultural superiority over that of their hosts in Dar es 
Salaam’ (Mann 2012: 194). I have described elsewhere in detail how the almajirai depict 
themselves as being particularly moral in order to counter negative attitudes towards them 
(Hoechner 2011). Almajirai may also take refuge in self-conceptions that place their 
compliance with (presumed) Islamic norms in the foreground, relegating lack of economic 
success to the background. When I asked Ali and Abubakar, two young men and former 
almajirai in Albasu, one of whom was a barber, how their almajiri education had helped 
them in terms of their income-generating activities, they explained it thus:  
If for example you’re a barber and charge so and so much, and then someone 
comes and says, how much is the barbering, and you say 40 Naira [approximately 
£0.15], and you know actually it’s done for 30 Naira, you see, deception has 
come in. Therefore even if you assemble 1 million, these 10 Naira that you added 
will spoil all this money [before God]. But if you have Qur’anic knowledge, you 
wouldn’t do this … you wouldn’t cheat. 
The almajirai are certainly not alone in northern Nigeria in using Islam as their primary 
frame of reference. Together with other economically disenfranchised segments of society, 
however, they may resort to religious modes of thinking and arguing more frequently so as to 
maintain viable self-definitions. From the point of view of classical economics, the behaviour 
condemned in the quote above looks like a fairly conventional procedure to tap customers’ 
willingness to pay. It is reinterpreted in a way that prioritizes moderation in the pursuit of 
profit and ‘honesty’ over individual economic advancement. Being able to recast a lack of 
economic success in positively connoted religious terms may be an important resource to 
buffer frustration.  
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Religion also provides a frame of reference for the almajirai to preserve their dignity in 
highly unequal relationships with other members of society. As religious scholars, to some 
extent they can conceive of themselves as legitimate recipients and even claimants of charity, 
meaning that they can assess the treatment they receive in religious terms. The almajirai’s 
interpretation of their begging helped them to maintain some self-respect in the face of 
denigrating treatment. Abdurrahman and Canham (1978: 70), who write about child-rearing 
in northern Nigeria, ask whether there could be any ‘better way to [practise humility] than to 
make oneself dependent on the charity of others for food and other necessities?’ Such an 
interpretation of begging as an educative practice reverberates, for example, in the following 
statement by Danjuma (aged fifteen):  
some people think … you come out to beg [because you don’t have food in your 
house]. But it’s not like that; it’s because you’re searching for knowledge. 
Before very long, most almajirai experience being insulted and chased away when begging. 
Some even describe physical assaults. As mentioned earlier, begging by almajirai has been 
attacked as un-Islamic. In this context, it is important to the almajirai that an interpretation of 
their begging as a legitimate activity is available. Insiders of the system widely believed that 
giving alms to almajirai was a form of worship. One father, for instance, explained to me that 
almajirai would receive more support nowadays as everyone was searching for a way to earn 
rewards in heaven. 
Almajirai embrace religious interpretations of the charity they receive. For example, 
one young student I befriended in Albasu had a crippled hand and limped. When I asked him 
whether he sometimes struggled to find enough food, he explained proudly that six 
households took care of feeding him. ‘Because he is crippled,’ a bystander declared. ‘Suna 
kyauta?’ I asked, enquiring whether the food was given as a free gift. ‘Suna sadaka,’ I was 
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corrected: it was given as charity. Whereas gifts (kyauta) connote transfers purely between 
humans, charity (sadaka) implicates God in the transfer.6  
In a similar vein, the almajirai I got to know during my research criticized those 
denying them support and respect for being malign and lacking faith and knowledge. One 
almajiri at Sabuwar Ƙofa (aged fifteen) argued in a ‘radio interview’ that almajirai in urban 
areas are treated worse than in rural areas because:  
most of the village people are [Qur’anic] teachers, they know the Qur’an and its 
importance very well. In Kano, some of them are illiterate. They only have the 
boko [modern] studies. 
Aliyu (eighteen years old) and Hamisu (about nineteen) equated supporting almajirai with 
having strong faith – and a failure to do so with a lack thereof: 
Aliyu: In Nigeria, how many almajirai do the rich take responsibility for? 
Hamisu: Actually, the rich in Nigeria, not all of them have faith [imani]. Out of a 
hundred, you can only get 1 per cent that have faith. 
Both the almajirai and their teachers thought that the rich in Nigeria did not fear God enough. 
With Muhammad, for instance, I talked about the differences between the children of the 
poor and the children of the elites. The latter would smoke marijuana and drink alcohol, some 
would not pray on time and others not at all, and they would not fast during Ramadan, he told 
me.  
The malamai I befriended in Albasu largely commended haƙuri, patience, as the 
appropriate response for the poor (talakawa) vis-à-vis elite corruption, and they trusted that 
God would restore justice once the Day of Judgement had come. I was surprised about the 
serenity and equanimity Ibrahim, a young teacher, and his senior malam showed when we 
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discovered that the Kano State official whom I had asked to convey Sallah presents for me to 
their school had stolen half of them. While I was appalled, the malam and Ibrahim shrugged 
the incident off as unsurprising.  
Scott reminds us that, even though ‘it may serve just as efficiently to produce daily 
compliance’, ‘resignation to what seems inevitable is not the same as according it legitimacy’ 
(Scott 1985: 324). The almajirai and their teachers understood that their penury was to some 
degree the product of other people’s actions, and they did not suspend their judgement of 
people higher up in the hierarchy. Often they invoked God, whom they thought was ‘on their 
side’, to substantiate their criticisms. One boy, for instance, argued about people giving bad 
food to almajirai:  
Allah said what you cannot eat, don’t give it to someone to eat, even if he’s a mad 
man. The people who are doing this, do not know. May Allah show them the 
way. May Allah give them understanding. (‘radio interview’) 
The almajirai were also confident that God would eventually ensure justice and punish the 
miserliness of the rich. During script writing for our film, one of the boys drafted a frank 
appeal to the political leaders and wealthy members of Nigerian society:  
We almajirai call upon you, why don’t you help the almajirai? You should know 
they are also citizens of this country. Therefore, for God’s sake, keep looking 
after them. Everything you give is your share (rabo) in the afterlife. But you 
don’t care, you don’t think of the afterlife … ALLAH doesn’t care a fig about 
your money or rule (mulki), you will only reap what you have sown. Therefore, 
better prepare before your death. 
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In brief, the almajirai found strong words to criticize the rich in society, and to demand that 
resources be distributed more equitably. Yet, at the same time, when relating their own life 
histories, they concealed compromising personal circumstances. This is what I turn to next. 
Keeping up appearances 
Walker et al., asking how poor people handle poverty-related shame, found that they struggle 
to keep up appearances, to conceal their poverty and to avoid ‘situations likely to publicly 
expose their circumstances’ (Walker et al. 2013: 227). This has also been argued for young 
people (see, for example, Sutton 2009). The almajirai pursued similar strategies. As migrants 
– newcomers in their places of study and far enough from home to have some control over 
the information ‘trickling through’ from their communities – they could keep to themselves 
the circumstances that had led to their enrolment as almajirai (see Hoechner 2013b, where I 
discuss the opportunities migration offers to almajirai in more depth). These circumstances 
are often experienced as embarrassing, as they are shaped by a lack of support from 
(supposedly responsible) social elders as a consequence of poverty, divorce or death.  
For example, on one occasion, Saifillahi was at my house when two girls from a 
northern elite family living in the neighbourhood came to visit with a female relative aged 
about twenty who did not know Saifillahi. While she tried to ascertain his social position, he 
cunningly avoided answering her questions. Rather than ‘giving away’ the fact that he was an 
almajiri at my neighbour’s school, he declared himself to be ‘the one selling petrol along the 
road’. When we talked about our planned trip to his father’s house during Sallah, he said he 
lived ‘far … you get there only by car’ (suggesting overland travel) – a fairly deceptive 
description of the slum neighbourhood within Kano City where his father actually resides 
(some 30 minutes from Sabuwar Ƙofa on public transport). 
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Even schoolmates who had been enrolled in the same Qur’anic school for years and 
shared their daily routines with each other as friends knew very little about each other’s 
family backgrounds. Bashir, for instance, did not know that Khalidu was orphaned and had 
become an almajiri as a consequence of parental death. They had been schoolmates for over 
two years and appeared to be quite close friends.  
It is understandable that the almajirai seek to keep their life histories private in a 
context where giving away personal information means making oneself vulnerable.7 As a 
researcher, I regularly contravened rules of respect for people’s privacy by inquiring into 
personal circumstances and life trajectories. Expectably, my informants were reluctant to give 
away compromising information. Often it was only after probing, or engaging other family 
members in the conversation, that I found out about the underlying material circumstances of 
a child’s first enrolment as an almajiri. The young people themselves often prioritized 
religious and cultural values over material constraints when explaining their careers as 
almajirai.  
Idris, for example, in his early twenties, had enrolled as an almajiri after only one 
month of secondary school. When I asked about the school change, he explained it in terms 
of the importance of religious knowledge in this world and the hereafter. Only when I probed 
whether any key event had triggered his leaving secondary school did he reveal that his father 
had died at the time. 
When the script adviser, a professional from the Kano film industry, suggested that 
destitution was indeed a factor underpinning the enrolment of children as almajirai, the boys 
nodded approval. Yet they also agreed to his suggestion to disregard this aspect of the system 
in their script. On other occasions, the almajirai rejected explanations invoking poverty or 
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difficult conditions at home (such as parental divorce or death) as reasons for almajiri 
enrolment outright. For example, Naziru (fifteen years old) contended that:  
people bring their children to Qur’anic school not because they hate them, but 
because they want them to have the knowledge (ilimi). 
I do not mean to imply that people do not mean what they say when they stress the 
importance of religious knowledge, or that almajiri enrolments are necessarily caused by 
acute household emergencies. Rather, my point here is that people are likely to seize the 
opportunity to conceal personally compromising circumstances if such an opportunity offers 
itself. The almajiri system and its ideology provide a versatile tool for such concealment 
strategies. Enrolment as almajiri does not require an explanation in terms of personal 
circumstance: after all, searching for religiously enjoined knowledge is not an endeavour in 
need of justification. The conclusion considers the implications of strategies that conceal the 
material bases of the almajiri system for opportunities to demand social and economic 
justice. Yet before concluding, I describe one last strategy employed by the almajirai I got to 
know well, which also has a potentially problematic effect, namely that of shifting the blame 
apportioned to them onto other almajirai. 
Assuaging shame through ‘othering’: corroding social cohesion? 
Chase and Walker (2013: 749–50) find that experiences of poverty-related shame, instead of 
giving rise to collective action, actually undermine social solidarity. Their informants felt that 
dominant images of the poor as lazy or undeserving did not fit with their own perceptions of 
themselves and their lives. But rather than rejecting such denigrating images, their 
informants: 
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sought to find others who fitted the widely promulgated portrayal of the undeserving 
poor, hence finding comfort in the belief that they were no longer at the bottom of the 
social pile … [R]espondents inadvertently divided any concept of ‘us’ into smaller 
units and set themselves in opposition to other groups of people in poverty. (Walker et 
al. 2013: 229) 
This is a strategy that the almajirai also embraced. By distinguishing themselves from other 
almajirai, for example, whom they considered to be at risk or fault, they could escape the 
negative image of the almajiri system in general.  
Young almajirai are very much at the bottom of the social pile in their schools, and 
older students often take advantage. For instance, younger students may be sent by older 
students to beg for food for them. I heard of students who write Qur’anic verses on the right 
hand of the boys they send to beg: if the ink has come off when the boy comes back (licked 
off together with the food eaten ‘clandestinely’ rather than being handed in), he will be in 
trouble.  
While older students thus know how to benefit from the presence of younger students 
in their schools, the almajirai I talked to did not hesitate in drawing a dividing line between 
themselves and young almajirai. The youths participating in the film project held the 
enrolment of very young children to be largely responsible for the negative image of the 
almajiri system. Too small to do physical work, they would necessarily have to rely on 
charity for a living. One boy explained that, because they begged on the street and in car 
parks, chanting ‘Allah ya kiyaye, Allah ya kare’ (‘May God protect/look after you’), they got 
on people’s nerves and were insulted and chased away. The almajirai recommended in their 
messages in the end credits of the film that parents should not enrol small children, and that if 
they enrolled them they should visit them regularly.  
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To put some distance between themselves and the almajirai attracting most of the 
negative attention, the young people also drew a strong dividing line between children 
begging for money on the street (mostly very young children) and children begging for food 
at houses (slightly older boys). This argument emerged during our discussions of the 
photographs the almajirai at Sabuwar Ƙofa had taken with disposable cameras in 2009. 
While they considered ‘begging at houses’ acceptable and safe, they deemed ‘begging on the 
street’ corrupting and dangerous. There was some disagreement as to why almajirai take to 
the street to beg – whether it was because of ‘profligacy’ (iskanci) or because of a need for 
cash. The children concurred, however, that begging on the street was physically dangerous, 
as children risked being hit by a car, and that it went hand in hand with truancy. One boy 
went so far as to claim that begging on the street was not even ‘proper begging’, as begging 
(bara) was ‘house by house’ (as opposed to maula, which is usually for money). The fact that 
the young people dissect the broader category of almajirai in this way casts doubts on the 
opportunities for solidarity to develop.  
CONCLUSION 
Inequalities are growing on a global scale today. Arguably, this alters the way in which 
poverty is perceived and experienced. This paper has sought to trace such changes in northern 
Nigeria. I have argued that in a context of growing socio-economic inequality and 
consumerism, poverty has increasingly negative connotations. Urbanization and demographic 
growth have given rise to an increased movement and mixing of people. This has increased 
the importance of material wealth as a sign of status as it can be displayed instantaneously. 
Lacking material means has become more painful than in the past. Given such changing 
contexts, how do poor people experience their situation? What role does religion play in their 
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lives? This paper has tried to shed light on these questions by studying how young Qur’anic 
students in Kano experience, and deal with, being poor.  
Even though structural changes that emphasize consumerism and wealth-based 
definitions of status constrain their room for manoeuvre, the almajirai resist victimization to 
some extent. By making creative use of religious and cultural arguments, they manage to 
retain viable self-definitions. They deploy discourses that cast deprivation as a voluntary 
exercise in asceticism and a valuable form of character building. Also, they put their trust in 
God and his ability to eventually restore justice. All too frequently it is assumed that poverty 
and religion, if combined, lead to problematic outcomes. Yet, rather than radicalizing the 
almajirai, religion helps them endure difficulties and denigration. This is an important insight 
in a global context where Muslims, especially those who are poor, are frequently vilified as 
‘foot soldiers’ and ‘cannon fodder’ for violence. 
While the almajirai’s strategies certainly help them save face and buffer frustration, do 
they have the potential to contribute to social and economic change and a lasting 
improvement of the almajirai’s conditions? In all probability no: by embracing self-
conceptions as devoted searchers for sacred knowledge, and by concealing some of their 
personal circumstances, ironically they become more vulnerable. They adopt a narrative that 
prioritizes the cultural and religious aspects of the almajiri system over its material bases. 
Thereby, they may unwittingly buttress culturalist explanations. Such explanations often 
reduce the complex circumstances leading to almajiri enrolment to a matter of parental 
backwardness and religious fundamentalism. Such views, in turn, stigmatize the 
constituencies of the almajiri system and detract from the material context of the system.  
Finally, the young Qur’anic scholars I got to know well responded to the negative 
image of their education system by ‘othering’ students who were in an even weaker position 
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than they were. In an attempt to improve their own position, they malign other almajirai, for 
example. This raises questions about the chances for solidarity and social cohesion, and an 
awareness of the origins of their shared predicament in the political economy – ‘class 
consciousness’ – to develop among people on the bottom rungs of society. As long as 
consumerism and wealth dominate definitions of status within society, it is likely to be 
difficult for people suffering from the negative connotations of poverty to speak up for 
themselves and demand social justice. 
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1 I changed or removed the names of informants where I felt it necessary to protect their 
identity. Where informants were comfortable with statements being published under their 
name and where I considered this safe for them, I left names unchanged. 
2 The political and social transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
would eventually change this. The gradual ending of slavery brought about by colonialism 
created novel opportunities for social mobility, which fuelled demand for religious education 
as an avenue to high status (see Hoechner 2013a). 
3 The abstract noun corresponding to talaka/talakawa is talauci, which means poverty. While 
people make frequent reference to their own or other people’s status as talakawa, I have 
never heard anyone mentioning their own or someone else’s former slave status. 
4 As Last writes, ‘wealth is now expressed in money, and can be acquired, accumulated and 
spent in many more ways than before’ (Last 2000a: 236–37).  
5 Short for Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunna (Arabic), which means ‘Society for 
the Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna’ (see Loimeier 1997). Like 
other reformist Muslims, Izala followers demand the removal of what they consider ‘cultural 
accretions’ to Islam. 
6 Even though such religious interpretations of begging were available to them, the almajirai 
I befriended during my research unanimously preferred work to begging. 
7 Some almajirai told me that they do not usually share their father’s name with their peers 
(despite patronyms being widely used as a means of identification). This is to make sure that 
no one can use it to insult or curse them. 
